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Some Options for Iran Policy

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EXCISE

The Problem

To choose a consistent set of policies that will (1) secure the hostages' release on terms consistent with our national honor and interests, and (2) encourage development of a relatively stable Iranian leadership that will not threaten Western access to Gulf oil and will resist Soviet expansion.

Set forth below are a range of policy options aimed at realizing these objectives.

Seeking Release of the Hostages

-- Continue to seek exchanges with the Nabavi committee on the Parliament's four conditions in the expectation that "clarifications" by both sides can lead to an Iranian decision to declare our position acceptable and thus the release of the hostages.

-- Refuse further exchanges on the grounds our position is clear and political and legal constraints prevent further changes. Accept that such a decision could lead to the hostages' trial and imprisonment, but more likely a decision in Iran to return the matter to the Parliament for further consideration on the grounds the U.S. has met some but not all of the Iranian demands.

-- Issue an ultimatum, coupled with threats of additional firm steps. Recognize, however, that military action may not convince the present leadership to release the hostages and could even make an eventual rapprochement with Iran more difficult.

Basic U.S. Policy Towards the Revolutionary Regime

-- Continue to recognize the revolution and follow a policy of restraint and non-interference to allow the present power struggle to work itself out. Recognize that both the moderates and extremists in Iran are non-Communist and some leaders in both factions have shown themselves to be pragmatic and realistic.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u>AmBolsley</u>	DATE <u>5/28/85</u>
RDS ☐ EXT. DATE	REASON(S)
TS AUTH.	
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS	☐
DECLASSIFIED	☐ RELEASABLE
RELEASE DENIED ☒ in part	
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS	<u>(b)(1) (a)(5)</u>

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-- Ease our restrictions in this respect, recognizing that allowing greater access by exiles may signal to Iran a modification of our policy of accepting the revolution.

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